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Equal Protection Scrutiny of High
School Athletics
INTRODUCTION
During the last several years, courts have grappled with
the relatively new issue of sex discrimination as a violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 Al-
though the United States Supreme Court has decided many
sex discrimination issues, it has not addressed the issue of sex
discrimination in sports.2 However, this issue has been raised
in the lower courts in a variety of contexts. One of the most
commonly litigated issues is the constitutionality of "separate
but equal" athletic teams for females and males.3 Another is
the constitutionality of prohibiting female participation on
all-male teams either when the school provides only a male
team for the sport,4 or when a team for each sex is provided. 5
Although those issues are of some relevance by analogy,
they are not the subject of this Comment and no attempt is
made to analyze or resolve them. Instead, this Comment fo-
cuses on a reverse issue-the constitutional validity of al-
lowing female high school students more opportunities to par-
ticipate on athletic teams than their male counterparts. The
discussion centers on a recent decision, Clark v. Arizona In-
' See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (statute providing for mandatory
choice of the father over the mother as administrator for a deceased child's estate
violates equal protecton). Reed was the first Supreme Court decision to invalidate a
statute on grounds of sex discrimination. See H. KAY, SEX-BASED DIsCRIMINATION 26
(2d ed. 1981).
But cf. O'Connor v. Board of Educ., 449 U.S. 1301 (Stevens, Circuit Justice,
1980) (Federal district court granted preliminary injunction allowing female junior
high students to try out for the male basketball team even though separate teams
were provided for each sex. The appellate court stayed the district court's injunction.
Justice Stevens, Supreme Court justice for that circuit, upheld the appellate court's
stay of the preliminary injunction), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
3 See, e.g., Ritacco v. Norwin School Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Pa. 1973)
(rule requiring separate male and female teams for interscholastic non-contact sports
does not violate equal protection).
4 See, e.g., Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 342 F. Supp. 1224 (D. Minn.
1972), afl'd, 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
1 See, e.g., Darrin v. H.D. Gould, 540 P.2d 882, 887 (Wash. 1975).
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terscholastic Association,6 which sustained the constitutional-
ity of regulations prohibiting males from participating on the
female volleyball team, the only volleyball team available at
their schools.7 However, the regulations permitted female par-
ticipation on all-male teams.8
The plaintiffs in Clark were male Arizona high school stu-
dents who, although talented volleyball players,9 were denied
the opportunity to play interscholastic volleyball because the
teams sponsored by their schools were exclusively for fe-
males. 10 The Arizona Interscholastic Association (AIA) regula-
tions precluded "boys from playing on the girls' teams, even
though girls [were] permitted to participate on boys' athletic
teams.""
The federal district court in Arizona dismissed the plain-
tiffs' claim that precluding boys from playing on the girls'
team violated the equal protection clause."2 The court of ap-
peals affirmed the dismissal, by holding that the governmental
interests of redressing past discrimination against women in
0 695 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983).
7Id. at 1127. The Clark decision was based on the equal protection clause and
did not refer to Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-86
(1983). Title IX, while relevant to the topic of this Comment, will not be discussed
since Clark was not based on statutory interpretation. Further, proof of compliance
with this federal statute would merely prove statutory compliance, not whether such
actions are constitutional. See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.
718, 732-33 (1982) ("[N]either Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the
rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."). See generally Skilton, The
Emergent Law of Women and Amateur Sports: Recent Developments, 28 WAYN L.
REv. 1701, 1701-57 (1981-82) (discussion of relation between Title IX and equality of
opportunity for women).
8 695 F.2d at 1127. See note 35 infra for a further discussion of the situation.
See 695 F.2d at 1127 (the plaintiffs had participated on national champion-
ship volleyball teams sponsored by the Amateur Athletic Union).
10 Id.
21 Id.
2 Before any party can successfully invoke the equal protection clause, some
form of state involvement in the alleged discrimination must be proved. See gener-
ally J. WEisTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 32-36 (1979); Note, The Case For
Equality in Athletics, 22 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 570, 572-77 (1973). In Clark, the regula-
tions challenged as violative of equal protection were promulgated and enforced by
the Arizona Interscholastic Association (AIA). 695 F.2d at 1128. Although the state
action issue was not raised, the court dutifully noted that "every court to consider the
question has concluded that associations like the AA are so intertwined with the
state that their actions are considered state action." Id. at 1127.
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athletics and promoting equality of opportunity for males and
females were sufficient to justify the regulations."3
I. THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY
The foundation underlying the following discussion is
that the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
applies equally to males and females. The necessity for even-
handed application of the equal protection clause to males
and females is demonstrated by analogy to equal protection
analysis of race discrimination cases in which it has been held:
"If both [blacks and whites] are not accorded the same pro-
tection then it is not equal. '14 It must be remembered that
males also have borne a significant share of gender discrimina-
tion. Examples of discrimination against males include com-
pulsory military service for males, statutory and judicial pref-
erence for females in child custody proceedings, and spouse
and child support duties delegated primarily to males."' More-
over, in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,6 the
Court held: "That [a statute] discriminates against males
rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny
or reduce the standard of review.' '1
Depending on the class of persons being discriminated
against, the Supreme Court has employed at least three differ-
ent levels of scrutiny for equal protection challenges. For clas-
sifications based on inherently suspect categories, 8 the Court
applies a standard of strict scrutiny of the highest level, under
which only a compelling government interest can sustain the
divergent treatment.19 However, a majority of the Court has
,3 695 F.2d at 1131-32.
" Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978).
See generally Kanowitz, "Benign" Sex Discrimination: Its Troubles and
Their Cure, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1379, 1430 (1980) (arguing that past discrimination
against both sexes is a sufficient reason for denying preferential treatment to either
sex).
". 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
1 Id. at 723 (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 394 (1979) (emphasis
added)).
I" See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (alienage is a
suspect category); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (race is a suspect
category).
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 309-10, 320.
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never held classifications based on gender to be an inherently
suspect category deserving of strict scrutiny.20 Instead, two
other standards are employed to scrutinize equal protection
challenges to classifications based on gender: an "intermedi-
ate" standard of scrutiny and a "not similarly situated"
standard.21
II. THE INTERMEDIATE LEVEL OF SCRUTINY
The test most often employed in gender discrimination
challenges is an "intermediate" level of scrutiny under which
discrimination is more difficult to prove than when the strict
scrutiny test is utilized.22 The intermediate level of scrutiny
consists of a two part test.2" First, an important government
interest must be shown to be the basis for the dissimilar treat-
ment.24 However, even if the asserted government interest is
determined to be important, it will still fail the first part of
the test if it is not a "legitimate"25 government purpose. For
example, if the asserted interest is not the government's ac-
tual interest or if it is an unnecessary interest, the regulation
containing the gender based classification will fail this part of
the test.26 Once an important government interest is deter-
20 But cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (plurality of four
held sex to be suspect category and deserving of strict scrutiny).
21 An intermediate level of scrutiny should be employed unless it is determined
that the sexes are not similarly situated, in which case the level of scrutiny is lowered.
See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354-57 (1979). The court in Clark apparently
confused the tests. Although the holding was obviously based on the assumption that
males and females are not similarly situated with respect to athletics, thus allowing
for use of the lowest level of scrutiny, the intermediate level of scrutiny was applied.
See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 79 (1983).
21 See Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 468-69 (1981).
23 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
2, See id.
25 See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725. ("If the State's
objective is legitimate and important, we next determine whether the requisite direct,
substantial relationship between objective and means is present.").
2 Every government interest asserted, even though important, will not be auto-
matically accepted. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975) ("But the
mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which
protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme."). See also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1974) (invalidated gender based
legislation because it was unnecessary to serve an important government interest).
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mined to be legitimate, the gender based classification will be
sustained if the second part of the intermediate test is met.
To pass the second part of the test, the gender based classifi-
cation must be substantially related to fulfilling the impor-
tant government interest 7
In Clark, the state asserted two interests: promoting
equality of athletic opportunity between the sexes and re-
dressing past discrimination against women in athletics. 8 In-
stead of examining these interests to determine whether they
passed the first part of the intermediate scrutiny test, the
court summarily concluded without discussion that "[t]here is
no question that [these are] ... legitimate and important
governmental interest[s]." '29 Recent United States Supreme
Court decisions clearly reveal that there is a question as to
whether these asserted government interests are sufficient to
sustain the challenged regulations.30
Promoting equality of athletic opportunity is obviously
an important government interest.31 Therefore, unless pro-
moting equality of athletic opportunity was not the actual
purpose of the discriminatory regulations, the first part of the
test is satisfied. No facts are present in the Clark opinion
which could prove or disprove the validity of the asserted gov-
ernment interest. However, in the absence of relevant facts,
such a determination can still be made by, in effect, using the
second part of the intermediate test to disprove the first part
of the test.3 2 The lack of a substantial relationship between
the gender based classification and the fulfillment of the im-
" Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at
279.
28 Both of the government's asserted interests were treated as one in Clark. See
695 F.2d at 1129. For purposes of analysis, this Comment will treat each separately.
29 Id. at 1131.
30 See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351 (1974); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See also text accompanying notes 43-46
and 51-56 infra for a discussion of these cases.
3. Cf. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (Title IX of the Education Amendments which
provides for equal athletic opportunity for each sex).
32 Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 280 n.10 ("Of course, if upon examination it be-
comes clear that there is no substantial relationship between the statutes and their
purported objectives, this may well indicate that these objectives were not the stat-
utes' goals in the first place.").
1983-84]
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portant government interest asserted tends to disprove the
validity of the asserted interest.3 3 In other words, if there is no
substantial relationship between the discriminatory regula-
tions and the government interest of promoting equality of
athletic opportunity, then promoting equality of athletic op-
portunity was not the actual purpose of the regulations. Con-
sequently, the asserted regulations would fail the first part of
the intermediate scrutiny test.3 4
The question, then, is what relationship exists between
allowing females the opportunity to participate on more ath-
letic teams than males35 and promoting equality of athletic
opportunity between males and females. In Clark, the court
had little trouble finding a substantial relationship despite
recognizing the existence of alternative schemes which would
make athletic opportunities "more" equal .3  Although cor-
rectly noting that the exclusion of males was unnecessary to
accomplish equal athletic opportunities for females,37 the
court then relied on Kahn v. Shevin s to support its proposi-
tion that "absolute necessity is not required before a gender
based classification can be sustained."3 9 There are two flaws in
the court's reliance on Kahn. First, the court never deter-
mined whether equality of opportunity was already afforded
by the AIA regulations. To begin the analysis with the obser-
vation that "athletic opportunities could be equalized more
'3 See id.
N4 The first part of the intermediate test requires an important and legitimate
government interest to be present to support the gender classification. See Missis-
sippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725. Thus, the government interest, by
failing to be substantially related to the gender classification, could then in turn be
found not to have been an important and legitimate interest. Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
at 280 n.10.
" The AIA rules give females more athletic opportunities than males by specifi-
cally allowing females to participate on male non-contact sports teams while specifi-
cally precluding males from playing on any female teams. See 695 F.2d at 1127.
Whether females in these Arizona schools are allowed to participate on the male con-
tact sport teams cannot be ascertained from the facts. Therefore, this Comment is
limited to an analysis of opportunities for males and females in non-contact sports.
" See 695 F.2d at 1132.
' Id. at 1131 ("The existence of these alternatives shows only that the exclusion
of boys is not necessary to achieve the desired goal." (emphasis in original)).
416 U.S. at 351.
695 F.2d at 1131 (citing Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. at 351).
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fully"40 was to assume that opportunities were already equal
to some extent. Such an assumption was incorrect. Under the
AIA regulations, females had the opportunity to participate
on more athletic teams than their male counterparts.41 Conse-
quently, females actually had more opportunities than males
and, obviously, more opportunities are not equal opportunties.
Second, the court's reliance on Kahn indicates that the
court confused equality of opportunity with equality of re-
sults. In Clark, the court was faced with the issue of equal
opportunity. The purpose of the gender based legislation up-
held in Kahn was to promote equal results.42 More accurate
authority could have been obtained from Reed v. Reed,45 in
which the United States Supreme Court determined that
women must be afforded equal opportunities to compete with
their male counterparts for appointment to the position of ad-
ministrator.44 In order to provide equal opportunities, a deter-
mination of who is best qualified must be made on an individ-
ual basis. 45 Reed directly supports the proposition that
equality of opportunity is not contingent on equality of
results.46
40 Id.
41 See note 35 supra.
"' See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. at 353-54. The legislation upheld in Kahn pro-
vided tax breaks for widows, but not for widowers, because past economic discrimina-
tion against women has left them in an inferior economic position. Id. However, this
kind of legislation does not promote equal opportunities. This is remedial legislation
to make up for past discrimination. An example of legislation designed to provide
equal opportunities is the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(a)(1) (1976), which makes it unlawful "to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
41 404 U.S. at 71.
4 Id. at 74.
" See id. at 76 ("To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
members ofthe other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits,
is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ." (emphasis added)).
" Judicial notice was taken of the fact that many women will end up serving as
administrators due to their greater longevity. Id. at 75. The significance of Reed is
that equal opportunities must be afforded regardless of sex, even though the results
might be unequal. See id. at 76. That is, even though ultimately, more women may
serve as administrators due to physiological differences, Reed still held it necessary to
afford equal opportunities to males and females.
1983-84]
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Instead of concluding that the exclusion of males was not
necessary to achieve equal opportunities, the court in Clark
should have determined that allowing females more athletic
opportunities is not substantially related to achieving the
stated governmental interest of equality of athletic opportu-
nity between the sexes. Without the requisite substantial rela-
tionship, the government interest of promoting equality of
athletic opportunity would not pass the intermediate scrutiny
test.47 Unless the government's second interest can pass the
two part intermediate scrutiny test, the gender based AIA reg-
ulations violate the equal protecion clause.48
Although the second asserted government interest, re-
dressing past discrimination against females, is an important
government interest,49 it does not automatically pass the first
part of the intermediate scrutiny test.5 0 Although redressing
past discrimination against women did pass the intermediate
scrutiny test in Kahn v. Shevin5 ' and Califano v. Webster,52
both of these cases are distinguishable from Clark. The Court
sustained the gender based classifications in Kahn and Web-
ster because adult women were in actual need of remedial leg-
islation to make up for past economic discrimination. In
Kahn, widows were allowed property tax relief denied to wid-
owers because females were still affected by past economic
discrimination.54 Similarly, in Webster, women who reached
sixty-two years of age before 1975 were allowed economic ben-
efits to make up for past gender discrimination. 5  These
47 See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the interre-
latedness of the substantial relationship requirement and the important government
interest requirement.
48 As an alternative to gender based regulations favoring one sex, a school could
provide a multi-tiered athletic program consisting of a varsity level and sub-varsity
levels. See Note, Equal Protection: A Closer Look at Closer Scrutiny, 76 MIcH. L.
REv. 771, 871-81 (1977-78).
49 See, e.g., Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. at 317-20; Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. at
355.
o See note 26 supra.
51 See 416 U.S. at 355.
52 See 430 U.S. at 317-20.
13 See id. at 316; 416 U.S. at 353-54.
5 See 416 U.S. at 353-54.
Il 430 U.S. at 316-17. ,
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women, because of their age, were unable to benefit from re-
cent equal opportunities legislation, and without the statuto-
rily prescribed remedial measures they would have remained
victims of past economic discrimination.56
In contrast, the AIA regulations upheld in Clark were un-
necessary to redress past discrimination against females. The
preferential treatment was directed towards high school aged
females who had the privilege of beginning their athletic ca-
reers during a time of heightened awareness of past discrimi-
nation against females in sports. 7 Equal athletic opportuni-
ties for women are now federally mandated, 58 and the method
for enforcement is power of the purse.5 9
In Orr v. Orr"° the important government interest in re-
dressing past discrimination against women was determined
to be unnecessary under the circumstances and therefore
failed the first part of the intermediate scrutiny test. 1 Conse-
quently, the gender based classification imposing alimony ob-
ligations only on males was invalidated. 2 The Court also re-
jected an asserted compensatory governmental purpose for a
gender based classification in Mississippi University for
Women v. Hogan" stating: "[A] State can evoke a compensa-
tory purpose to justify an otherwise discriminatory classifica-
tion only if members of the gender benefited by the classifica-
tion actually suffer a disadvantage related to the
86 Women who reached 62 before 1974 had few years to benefit from the Equal
Pay Act of 1963, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206. Cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. at 354 n.7
(since most married women were unemployed, women forced into the job market be-
cause of the loss of a spouse had fewer economic skills to offer).
17 See generally APPENZELLER & APPENZELLER, SPORTS AND THE COURTS 71-88
(1980) (discusses the progression of women in athletics).
88 See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1983) ("[N]o person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
nation under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance.").
89 See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1983) (sanction for non-compliance with 20 U.S.C. §
1681(a) is loss of federal aid).
60 440 U.S. at 268.
61 See id. at 281.
2 See id. at 283 ("Where ...compensatory and ameliorative purposes are as
well served by a gender-neutral classification as one that gender classifies .... the
State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex." (emphasis added)).
6 458 U.S. at 718.
1983-84]
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classification."' 4 In Hogan, the Court held the all-female state
supported nursing college to be unconstitutional because no
showing was made "that women currently are deprived of
such opportunities."' 5
Likewise, in Clark, no showing was made that females
were being deprived of athletic opportunities. In fact, since
more opportunities were afforded to females in Clark, the
court should have held that, although redressing past discrim-
ination against women in sports is an important government
interest, it was unnecessary under the circumstances and
therefore failed the first part of the intermediate scrutiny test.
Since the important government interest of redressing
past discrimination is an unnecessary interest under the facts
of Clark, and an unnecessary government interest fails the
first part of the intermediate scrutiny test,66 there is no reason
to consider the substantial relationship element of the inter-
mediate scrutiny test. An unnecessary government interest
will not justify an "otherwise discriminatory classification. 61 7
Neither government interest passes the intermediate scrutiny
test; thus, the gender based regulations in Clark violate equal
protection unless they qualify for the alternative method68 of
scrutiny for equal protection challenges.
III. THE TRADITIONAL LEVEL OF SCRUTINY
In a few cases, the Supreme Court has determined that
males and females are not similarly situated and consequently
has lowered the scrutiny to the traditional level.69 Under this
analysis, the gender based classification will be upheld unless
the classification is so unrelated to a legitimate purpose that it
is irrational.7 0 The traditional method of analysis7 1 is relevant
6" Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
11 Id. at 729.
66 See, e.g., id. at 718; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. at 268.
17 See 458 U.S. at 728.
68 See note 21 supra.
69 See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 347.
70 See id. at 352.
71 The traditional level analysis is not to be confused with the foregoing interme-
diate level analysis which focused on redressing past discrimination against women.
Once the sexes are determined to be not similarly situated, the level of scrutiny is
[Vol. 72
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because the court in Clark upheld the gender based classifica-
tion because of physiological differences between males and
females.72 This indicates that at least some reliance was
placed on the assumption that males and females are not sim-
ilarly situated with respect to athletics. 73 However, close ex-
amination of the relevant Supreme Court decisions indicates
that such reliance was misplaced.
On three occasions the Court has validated gender based
classifications because the legal rights of either sex were abso-
lutely determined by statute. In Parhan v. Hughes,7 4 the
Court upheld legislation allowing only a mother to sue for the
*wrongful death of an illegitimate child because mothers and
fathers of illegitimate children are not similarly situated in
the state of Georgia.75 In Georgia, mothers are statutorily pre-
cluded from legitimizing their children and therefore are not
similarly situated with fathers who are statutorily permitted
to legitimize their children.7 6 Similarly, in Schlesinger v. Bal-
lard,77 the Court upheld a federal statute allowing female na-
val officers a longer time to obtain promotion before being dis-
charged for failure to advance in rank.78 Since females are
statutorily precluded from combat duty, and combat partici-
pation is considered in evaluations for promotions, they are
not similarly situated with males who have the opportunity to
participate in combat.79 Finally, in Rostker v. Goldberg,80 the
Court upheld the all-male draft registration."1 The Court rea-
lowered to the traditional level See id. at 353-57.
72 See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d at 1131 ("[D]ue to average
physiological differences, males would displace females to a substantial extent if they
were allowed to compete for positions on the volleyball team.").
7' The court in Clark apparently confused the tests. Although the court deter-
mined that the real issue was "whether any real differences exist between boys and
girls which justify the exclusion," it applied the intermediate level of scrutiny. See id.
at 1129.
74 441 U.S. at 347.
76 Id. at 355.
76 Id. ("Under Georgia law, only a father can by voluntary unilateral action make
an illegitimate child legitimate."). See GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-22 (1981).
77 419 U.S, 498, 505-06, 510 (1975).
78 Id. at 508-09.
71 See id. at 508.
80 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
81 See id. at 83.
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soned that since women as a group are precluded from combat
duty by statute and by military policy, they are not similarly
situated with males."2
These cases are distinguishable from Clark because the
females attending Arizona high schools were not statutorily
precluded from any kind of athletic opportunity. 3 Rather, in
Clark, the determination of whether high school males and fe-
males were not similarly situated was based on general physi-
ological differences.8 4 To date the Supreme Court has found
physiological differences between males and females sufficient
to render the sexes not similarly situated on only one occa-
sionY5 In Michael M. v. Superior Court,86 the physiological
difference relied on was the fact that only females are capable
of becoming pregnant.8 7 Such a physiological difference was
both specific and determinative. Clark is distinguishable from
Michael M. because the physiological differences relied on in
Clark were neither specific nor determinative: "Generally,
high school males are taller, can jump higher, and are stronger
than high school females. . . .Males generally have the po-
tential to be better [at two of the six basic volleyball skills]
and thus may dominate these two skills in volleyball." ' The
court obviously realized these were only general differences,
but erroneously concluded that these differences were
determinative.8 9
The general physiological differences relied on in Clark
are not determinative of diminished athletic opportunities for
females for two reasons. First, even if there are general differ-
82 See id. at 78. Cf. note 35 supra.
83 See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Ass'n, 695 F.2d at 1127.
84 See id. at 1131.
11 Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1975). In Geduldig, the Court upheld a
California statute providing disability benefits for any disability except pregnancy;
however, this case was not decided as a sex discrimination case. See id. at 496 n.20.
88 450 U.S. at 464 (Court upheld California "statutory rape" law which defined
"an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a female not the wife of a perpetra-
tor, where the female is under the age of 18 years" as unlawful sexual intercourse).
87 Id. at 471.
See 695 F.2d at 1127 (emphasis added). Serving, passing, setting, digging, hit-
ting and blocking are the six basic volleyball skills. The parties stipulated at trial that
males generally have the potential to be better hitters and blockers. Id.
88 Id. at 1131 ("Thus, athletic opportunities for women would be diminished.").
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ences between high school females and males, any person re-
gardless of gender may possess the differentiating characteris-
tic, i.e., the tendency to be taller, stronger or to jump higher
than the average representative of the opposite gender.
Height, strength, and jumping ability are not exclusively male
characteristics, as some females are taller, stronger, and better
jumpers than some malesY0 In contrast, becoming pregnant is
an exclusively female characteristic. Furthermore, height,
strength and jumping ability are not the sole factors deter-
mining which athlete makes the team, as there are many non-
physical characteristics which are also necesary to produce top
athletes.91 The physiological differences relied on in Clark are
not determinative differences; therefore, the AIA gender clas-
sifications do not qualify for "not similarly situated" scrutiny
which has only been invoked to justify gender based classifica-
tions when the position of either sex was absolutely deter-
mined by statute9 2 or by a specific and determinative physio-
logical difference 5
It should be noted that the Clark analysis contained a
significant deficiency. The court in Clark held that the physi-
ological differences justified the preclusion of males from the
female volleyball team.94 However, the male plaintiffs in Clark
were not asserting a constitutional right per se to play on the
female volle ball team. Their equal protection rights were vio-
lated because they were denied the same rights enjoyed by fe-
male students who had opportunities to: (1) compete in vol-
90 Cf. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (pen-
sion plan requiring larger contribution from females than males because women as a
class live longer than men violates the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
" See Note, Sex Discrimination in High School Athletics, 57 MINN. L. REV. 339
(1972-73):
These factors are not unique to either sex and may more than compensate
for lack of speed or strength in a given athlete, male or female. These in-
clude mind-body coordination, mental determination, sensory perception,
courage, intelligence, willingness to practice and experience. Different mix-
tures of these and other physiological factors are required for success in
different sports.
Id. at 363.
"' See text accompanying notes 74-82 supra.
" See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
" See 695 F.2d at 1131.
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leyball; and (2) compete on male teams.95 By sustaining the
constitutionality of prohibiting males from playing on the fe-
male team because of physiological differences, the court hung
its hat on a rationale which at most could have justified "sep-
arate but equal" teams for males and females. Consequently,
the real discrimination issue of denying males the same rights
afforded females was never reached.96
CONCLUSION
Without analyzing actual skill differentials, the court in
Clark justified the gender based classification by reference to
general physiological differences.9 7 Such classifications are
based on "archaic and overbroad generalizations"98 prohibited
by the equal protection clause.99
The Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down legisla-
tion purporting to classify according to sexual differences
which, in reality, classified according to sexual stereotypes.
For example, classifications based on each of the following
stereotypical assumptions violate equal protection: (1) females
usually are dependent on their male spouses but males usually
are not;100 (2) male workers' earnings are significantly more
vital to the support of their families than female workers'
earnings;1 1 (3) young males are destined to support a family
95 Id.
96 The Clark court seemed to have forgotten that for the plaintiffs, being barred
from.the female volleyball team meant being barred from volleyball. Instead of decid-
ing whether the school could constitutionally prohibit male participation on the fe-
male team, the court should have decided if the school could constitutionally provide
only one sex with opportunities to compete in a pirticular sport and opportunities to
compete on a team of the opposite gender.
See 695 F.2d at 1127.
See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1977); Attorney General v.
Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 393 N.E.2d 284, 293 (1979).
100 See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-83 (1979) (invalidated statute imposing ali-
mony obligations only on males); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. at 206-07 (invali-
dated Social Security provision for survivors' benefits for any widow but only for de-
pendent widowers); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688-90 (1973) (invalidated
a federal statute providing benefits for any female spouse of a service man but only
for dependent male spouses of service women).
101 See Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980) (invalidated a
workers' compensation law that provided benefits for the work related death of a
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but young females are destined to be supported;102 (4) mater-
nal roles are more important than paternal roles;103 (5) males
are more dangerous when drinking than are females;104 and
(6) nursing is an exclusively female occupation. 05
Many of these stereotypical assumptions are based on
some empirical support. 0 6 In Craig v. Boren,10  statistics es-
tablished that males in a particular age group were ten times
as likely to be arrested for driving under the influence of alco-
hol as were females in the same age group. 0 8 Yet, the Court
found these statistics insufficient to sustain the gender based
classification establishing different drinking ages for males
and females.'
The empirical support relied on in Clark falls far short of
conclusively establishing the effect of allowing males the op-
portunity to participate on female teams when no male team
is provided. Whether the physiological differences relied on 10
would in fact cause "athletic opportunities for women to be
spouse to all widows but only to dependent widowers); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S.
76, 87-89 (1979) (extended a provision of the AFDC program to grant benefits to
families with unemployed mothers as well as unemployed fathers); Weinberger v.
Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 644 (1975) (extended Social Security provision for
"mothers' benefits" to fathers).
101 See Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (invalidated a statute providing a
different age of majority for females and males in context of parental support
obligations).
10) See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1979) (invalidated a statute
allowing unwed mothers but not unwed fathers to block the adoption of their child by
simply withholding consent).
10 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 200-02 (1976) (invalidated a statute provid-
ing different drinking ages for females and males).
'0' See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 729-30 (1982) (held
all state supported nursing colleges for women to be in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause).
1o See, 'e.g., Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. at 645 (citing Kahn v. Shevin,
416 U.S. 351, 354 n.7 (1974)) ("obviously, the notion that men are more likely than
women to be primary supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely without
empirical support").
107 429 U.S. at 190.
108 Id. at 200-02 ("[Tjhe statistics broadly establish that .18% of females and
two percent of males in that age group were arrested for that offense.").
10* Id. ("While such a disparity is not trivial in a statistical sense, it hardly can
form the basis for employment of a gender line as a classifying device.").
11 See 695 F.2d at 1127 ("Generally high school males are taller, can jump
higher and are stronger than high school females.").
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diminished""' was not factually or conclusively deter-
mined.112 To the contrary, the holding in Clark was the prod-
uct of "archaic and overbroad generalizations," and such gen-
eralizations violate equal protection.
Barbara L. Pryor
1 Id. at 1131.
112 The court in Clark did not rely on known results of mixed athletic competi-
tion as evidence. Instead, the court relied on what it believed would happen. See 695
F.2d at 1126.
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